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I. THE BACKGROUND 
Over twenty years have passed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis 
v. Monroe County Board of Education set out the deliberate indifference 
standard for Title IX claims against a federally funded educational institution 
for student-student sexual harassment.1 Yet, at least in the Sixth Circuit, there is 
still a large difference in opinion about how to interpret and apply the third prong 
of this standard: whether the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to 
the harassment.2  This difference is demonstrated by the case of Foster v. Board 
of Regents of University of Michigan.3 Rebecca Foster sued the University of 
Michigan (the “University”) under Title IX, claiming that the University’s 
response to the sexual harassment of her by another student was deliberately 
indifferent.4 The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
University, and Foster appealed to the Sixth Circuit.5 The first time the Sixth 
Circuit decided Foster’s case, it held that the lower court improperly granted 
summary judgment.6 However, the second time the Sixth Circuit heard Foster’s 
case en banc, it decided the lower court was actually correct in granting 
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 1 Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. Of Ed., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Title IX provides that “No 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 
§  1681 https://www.justice.gov/crt/title-ix-education-amendments-1972 
[https://perma.cc/FFD3-KFTU]. 
 2 Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 3 Foster v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 982 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2020) 
[hereinafter Foster II] vacated en banc Foster v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. of Michigan 952 
F.3d 765, 779 (6th Cir. 2020) [hereinafter Foster I]. 
 4 Foster I, 952 F3d at 779. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 781. 
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summary judgment.7 The difference between the two Sixth Circuit opinions 
turns on how each panel of judges interpreted the third prong of the deliberate 
indifference standard. This difference, and the interpretation chosen by the Sixth 
Circuit, will likely lead to three ramifications: one, victims of student-student 
sexual assault will be less likely to sue; two, victims will be less likely to win 
on summary judgment, therefore limiting their bargaining power; and three, 
universities are disincentivized to respond appropriately to victims claims.  
II. THE LAW 
As there are many different standards of law in play here, let us take a 
moment to break them down. First, a motion for summary judgment asks the 
court to rule in favor for one of the parties because there is no way a reasonable 
jury could render a verdict against that party, as there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact.8 In Foster, the lower court found that “it would be simply 
impossible for a reasonable jury conclude that the University was deliberately 
indifferent under Title IX and granted summary judgment for the University.”9  
Second, en banc means that the entire bench of judges decides to hear a 
case.10 The first time the Sixth Circuit heard the Foster case, it only had a panel 
of three judges.11 The court then chose to re-hear the case with a panel of 
fourteen judges.12 
Third, the deliberate indifference standard dictates that a party must show: 
1. that the sexual harassment was so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive that it could be said to deprive the plaintiff of access to an 
educational opportunity or benefit, 
2. that the funding recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual 
harassment, and 
3. that the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the 
harassment.13 
The Supreme Court in Davis elaborated on the third prong by stating that 
“funding recipients are deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ to acts of student-on-
 
 7 Foster II, 982 F.3d at 962. 
 8 Foster I, 952 F3d at 779. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
that “a movant must show 1) that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and 2) 
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Summary Judgment, CORNELL 
LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/summary_judgment [https://perma.cc/6U7Q-P7GN].  
 9 Foster I, 952 F.3d at 779 (internal quotes omitted).  
 10 En Banc, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/en_banc#:~:text=French%20for%20%22on%20the%20b
ench,particular%20court%20hear%20a%20case [https://perma.cc/57CT-8VKR]. 
 11 Foster I, 952 F.3d at 770. 
 12 Foster II, 982 F.3d at 961. 
 13 Foster I, 952 F3d at 779 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 650). 
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student harassment only where the recipient's response to the harassment or lack 
thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”14 
III. FOSTER V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
The main issue in Foster’s case surrounded the third prong.15 The majority 
in Foster I and the dissent in Foster II used the Davis standard in determining 
that summary judgment was incorrect, finding that a jury could find the 
University’s conduct clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances 
and therefore deliberately indifferent.16 However, the majority in Foster II 
appeared to use a good-faith standard interpretation of how to apply the Davis 
standard in determining that summary judgment was correct, as demonstrated 
by the language of the opinion and the critique of the dissent.17  
A. Foster I: Summary Judgment was Improper. 
The first time the Sixth Circuit heard Foster’s case, the court recounted the 
facts of the case, highlighting each time Foster reported the sexual harassment 
to University officials and the response of the officials.18 After considering 
those facts, the court concluded in a two-to-one decision that there was a genuine 
dispute of material fact regarding the third prong: whether the University was 
deliberately indifferent to Foster’s plight.19 The court found that a reasonable 
jury could conclude that the University’s response was clearly unreasonably in 
light of the known circumstances.20 The court summarized five separate actions 
of the harasser and reactions of the University and pointed out that a reasonable 
jury could find for either party in all five situations.21  
B. Foster II: Just Kidding, Summary Judgment was Proper! 
The second time the Sixth Circuit heard Foster’s case, the court viewed the 
facts through a good-faith standard.22 After reviewing the facts, the court found 
that University was no deliberately indifferent because they had responded at 
all.23 This approach did not seem to consider whether a jury could go either way 
on whether the behavior was clearly unreasonable in light of the circumstances. 
The dissent, written by the same judge who wrote the majority opinion in Foster 
 
 14 Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. 
 15 Foster I, 952 F.3d at 779; Foster II, 982 F.3d at 962. 
 16 Foster I, 952 F.3d at 779; Foster II, 982 F.3d at 972–89 (Moore, J. dissenting). 
 17 See generally Foster II, 982 F.3d 960. 
 18 Foster I, 952 F.3d at 783–88.  
 19 Id. at 771–72. 
 20 Id. at 791. 
 21 Id. at 783–88. 
 22 See generally Foster II, 982 F.3d 960. 
 23 Id. at 966–67. 
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I, reiterated her arguments for the correct interpretation. She stated that funding 
recipients are deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ to acts of student-on-student 
harassment only where the recipient's response to the harassment or lack thereof 
is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”24 Another 
dissenter “emphasize[d] the [dissent’s] observation that the majority's seeming 
application of a good-faith standard is unmoored from any applicable legal 
precedent.”25 
IV. THE CONCLUSION 
The official interpretation of the Davis deliberate indifference standard in 
the Sixth Circuit is a good faith basis. The Foster I decision and Foster II dissent 
present a compelling argument that the correct interpretation is whether the 
institution’s response is clearly unreasonable in light of the circumstances. The 
takeaway from the Foster cases seems to be if a university makes a good-faith 
(but potentially unreasonable in light of the circumstances) response to a claim 
of student-student sexual harassment, the University is likely to win on a 
summary judgement motion. The court’s stance on how to interpret deliberate 
indifference will likely lead to at least three concerning ramifications. One, 
victims of student-student sexual harassment will be even less likely to sue 
universities under Title IX. The bar that universities must meet to be considered 
compliant, i.e., not deliberately indifferent, has been lowered by the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in Foster II. Two, even if a victim decides to take the risk and 
sue their university, they are less likely to win on summary judgment. This 
results in a reduction of the victims bargaining power in settlement 
negotiations.26 Three, because the accountability mechanism of a lawsuit has 
been so weakened (see first two ramifications), universities will not respond to 
victims claims appropriately. If the Foster I decision had not been vacated, 
student victims of sexual harassment would be in a far better position than they 
are today. 
 
 24 Id. at 981 (Moore, J. dissenting).  
 25 Id. at 989 (White, J. dissenting). 
 26 “Put simply, the settlement value of a case increases when a motion for summary 
judgment is denied. Thus, denials of summary judgment up the ante in the litigation game.” 
Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 689, 689 (2012) 
[https://perma.cc/PG2R-4F3U]. 
